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Ten years after the Federal Reserve’s crisis-era bank stress test, it is time to recalibrate the 
stress tests for “peacetime.” Outside of a crisis, supervisors should tailor stress tests to focus 
on their comparative advantages by taking a macroprudential focus, with severe scenarios 
that enable them to learn about emerging risks in both traditional and shadow banking 
sectors. In peacetime also, supervisors should emphasize risk-management practices and be 
wary of forcing rapid changes in capital levels for individual banks, while linking stress-test 
results with countercyclical capital buffers across the system. 
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The United States Federal Reserve’s (the “Fed”) Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 
(SCAP) in the spring of 2009 was a revelation for bank supervisors. They escaped their 
traditional, balance-sheet-driven model to ask, in a forward-looking way, what will it take 
for these firms to survive if the crisis gets even worse? Fed Vice Chair Randy Quarles recently 
called this the Fed’s newly found role to provide “analysis of last resort” in a crisis (Quarles, 
2019). Since the previous autumn, amidst the worst financial crisis in decades, the 
government had invested tens of billions of dollars in banks that passed a more traditional, 
point-in-time viability test through the Capital Purchase Program, but investors remained 
skittish. The supervisory stress-test exercise, because it credibly sized the potential capital 
needs of the largest banks, is broadly seen as having done much more to reassure markets 
than those earlier efforts. 
Just over 10 years later, stress testing has become deeply rooted in supervision and changed 
its practice. While the SCAP exercise had a very straightforward goal—to restore confidence 
in bank capital so banks could continue lending even if economic conditions worsened—
supervisors here and abroad expect more of such exercises today. Stress tests have 
contributed to U.S. banks doubling their capital, increased the transparency about 
supervisory practices to the public, and helped banks improve their capital planning and risk 
management. The Fed may use the results of the annual tests to prevent a bank that would 
fall below regulatory minimums under stress from passing profits on to shareholders. They 
also use stress tests to inform macroprudential policy. The Bank of England uses them to 
calibrate its countercyclical capital buffer. 
There is nonetheless a broad feeling that the exercise remains anchored in the global 
financial crisis. It also remains a contentious process, as bankers bristle at a perceived loss 
of control over basic capital planning decisions and what they see as an opaque process. One 
of the architects of the Fed’s first stress test wrote a few years ago about the need to develop 
a “peacetime” approach—one that seeks to ensure, with the crisis passed, that banks can not 
merely survive but keep lending and providing key services even in the face of a severe but 
plausible systemic shock (see Schuermann, 2016). The Fed has begun to take steps to update 
its approach for peacetime, while seeking to maintain its focus on the need to always be 
prepared for war.  
Right at the outset, it is important to note just how far we are from an ideal cost-benefit 
framework for bank-capital levels. To determine a socially optimal level for bank capital, we 
would want to know, at a minimum, what are the effects of bank-capital policy on lending 
and on the probability and severity of financial crises. Liang (2017) and the Minneapolis Fed 
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(2017) discuss various approaches that economists have taken to conduct cost-benefit 
analyses on capital levels. Academic estimates of the optimal level for bank capital that take 
systemic risks into account range from 9 percent to as high as 25 percent, considerably 
higher than pre-crisis levels (see Liang, 2017). But these things are hard enough to estimate 
even before we try to account for the possibility that capital policy could increase systemic 
risks by, in particular, driving the migration of activity from banks to nonbanks or off-balance 
sheet activities—where regulators may not be paying as much attention.  
In this paper, we partially sidestep these difficult issues by focusing on the dynamic nature 
of stress tests: that is, we take the overall level of bank-capital requirements as a given, and 
focus on how much volatility is appropriate around these requirements. Today, with the 
results of stress tests in hand, supervisors often require banks to change their capital ratios. 
In this world, the key policy questions are “How do we decide these required changes?” and 
“How fast must these changes occur?” While one cannot write down a complete cost-benefit 
framework to answer these questions, we make several observations in Section II that can 
be used to guide policy. Next, guided by those observations, we turn in Section III to a 
discussion of some recent and proposed changes in stress-testing practice. Section IV 
addresses a key question: Have we struck the right balance between companies and their 
regulators in determining the appropriate level of capital? Section V summarizes our 
conclusions and recommendations. 
II. Observations 
Observation 1: Individual banks know more than supervisors do about their banks’ idiosyncratic 
risks, but supervisors know more than banks do about systemwide risks. 
Banks will always know more than any outside party about their businesses, the profitability 
of their products, and the risks they are taking. To be sure, supervisors can use their 
statutory powers to learn a great deal, by acquiring data and confidential internal materials 
from the firms they supervise. The stress tests have inspired the Fed to acquire substantially 
more granular, structured data on a quarterly basis from the largest financial institutions 
than ever before. But the bankers retain the advantage. 
Bankers’ information advantage is particularly apparent in the analysis of complex, 
idiosyncratic business lines. For example, bank examiners would find it relatively 
straightforward to analyze the risks of a homogenous portfolio of credit card or home-
mortgage loans, but they might face serious challenges getting a handle on multi-billion-
dollar securities and derivatives portfolios that span numerous trading desks and legal 
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entities. Of course, those portfolios can be a challenge for bankers as well. The capital hole 
that the largest banks had to fill in 2008 was largely caused by their own failure to 
understand the risks they had retained in highly rated securities and derivative exposures 
against which they held little or no capital before the crisis. 
On the other hand, because of their access to confidential information and the broad scope 
of their authorities, supervisors will always know more about many aspects of banks than 
those banks know about each other. This advantage extends to analyzing horizontal 
exposures and risks, evaluating models, and assessing the quality of risk management. 
Supervisors use this information in microprudential oversight (providing insights to firms 
about best practices and common exposures) and in macroprudential oversight (identifying 
industrywide trends and potential risks). Stress tests offer further opportunities to develop 
and disseminate such insights. 
This observation suggests that there are some comparative advantages in stress-test 
modeling. Banks should focus on their own risk management and capital planning, tailored 
to the specific risks each bank faces; regulators should focus on macroprudential concerns, 
such as linkages and systemwide risks, using models and scenarios that are homogeneous 
across banks. 
Of course, this division of labor is consistent with current practice, with the necessary caveat 
that we cannot expect profit-maximizing banks to act as their own prudential regulators, so 
there will of course always need to be some give-and-take between the two parties. 
Another implication of focusing supervisory and bank-run stress tests on the comparative 
advantages of each is that the supervisory scenarios could be very scary and tough, 
experimenting with nightmarish hypotheticals. Meanwhile, with the regulators focused on 
ensuring that systemwide capital (capital across all systemically important banks, including 
the weakest among them) is maintained at high levels—raising those levels countercyclically 
in booming financial and economic conditions—the role of the bank-run stress tests in 
determining their own capital needs—a more microprudential goal—could be enhanced. 
Observation 2: In bank supervision, transparency is a double-edged sword. 
There are two types of transparency under discussion for stress tests: transparency of 
outputs (how did each bank do?), and transparency of inputs (how did the Fed come up with 
these numbers?). In the public discourse, there is a tendency to treat transparency as an 
obvious good thing, and anyone opposed to transparency as having some kind of nefarious 
motive. This tendency is reinforced by both research and practice in securities markets, 
where efficient functioning is promoted by reliable disclosure of information.  
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But banks are different from securities markets. A primary function of banks is to 
manufacture safe debt (“money”) backed by complex long-term assets. Bank balance sheets 
are far too complex to be analyzed by depositors, so our regulatory system has filled that role 
with insurance and supervision. Supervisors hold their communications with banks in strict 
confidence and regulations forbid banks from sharing results of exams with outside parties. 
This confidentiality helps maintain an open dialogue and information-sharing between 
supervisors and bankers. Based on longstanding regulations, examination ratings and 
informal actions—efforts by supervisors to address management deficiencies—are 
nonpublic. Examiners are authorized to go public only after initiating formal enforcement 
actions that address serious problems, abuses, violations of law, or noncompliance by 
regulated companies.  
Since the global financial crisis, stress testing has emerged as the rare exception to that 
tradition of confidentiality. In the United States and some other countries, stress testing 
practices have provided the public with unprecedented access to supervisors’ thinking about 
the management of individual financial institutions. In wartime, the revelation of stressed 
results helped reassure markets. In peacetime, the Fed extended its post-test disclosure to 
include both quantitative results and its qualitative assessment of each bank’s capital 
planning processes. But this transparency has potential costs. Even in peacetime, banks 
argue, disclosure of a bad stress-test result could harm its vital function of safe-debt creation. 
And banks are concerned that such disclosure could cause volatility for their core businesses. 
Furthermore, as peacetime moves towards a risk of crisis, public revelation of a particularly 
bad stress-test result could spark a panic. Thus, with regard to the transparency of outputs 
(“how did each bank do?”), we urge caution toward disclosing much further information 
about banks’ stress-test results.  
The specific arguments in favor of transparency of inputs come in several flavors. First, that 
it would lead to better models. Second, that it would enable banks to actually do a better job 
of getting ready for the most important risks as seen by supervisors. Third, that such 
transparency is in fact required for consistency with administrative law and regulatory 
practice. On the anti-transparency side there are two main arguments. First, fairly obviously, 
that banks would use such transparency to game the system. Second, that even in the 
absence of self-interested gaming behavior, transparency of models could lead to banks all 
tilting their portfolios in the same direction, leading to a “model monoculture” and a larger 
set of correlated risks (see Bernanke, 2013, and Schuermann, 2013).  
Reasonable people can disagree about how to weigh these costs and benefits for additional 
transparency of inputs. But reasonable people cannot claim that the answer is an easy one, 
and should not ignore the trade-offs. 
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Observation 3: Even with perfect models accepted by everyone, banks and their regulators will 
rationally disagree on the optimal speed of adjustment after a stress test. 
We believe that it is important to acknowledge that there will always be a conflict here. Even 
if there was perfect agreement about models and scenarios, banks and regulators will still 
disagree on both optimal levels of capital and on the speed of adjustment to those levels. 
Focusing on the speed of adjustment, the reasons for the disagreement are simple: even in a 
counterfactual world where banks did not care about the steady-state level of capital, they 
would still find it costly to make changes to that level. Raising capital—or retaining extra 
profits by cutting dividends—sends warning signals to markets that all firms try to avoid. 
The costs of such adjustments may be private for the banks, but they are still real. Banks 
would not internalize the public benefits of a faster adjustment, and so they will always want 
to go slower than regulators will. This conflict strikes us as unavoidable.  
The main implication of this observation is a call for some understanding of both sides in the 
overall stress-test debate. Often, it seems to us that complaints by banks about modeling and 
scenarios are really just complaints about the resulting needs for banks to adjust their capital 
plans quickly in response to stress-test results. And, the regulators’ answers to these 
complaints do not always acknowledge the high costs of these changes, because the 
complaint has instead been buried in a technical objection to the model. Let’s stop that. Both 
sides have a point. Regulators have to maximize social welfare; banks explicitly have a 
different mandate. With their social-welfare objective, regulators should ultimately have the 
last word on capital levels, but they should be mindful of the costs of trying to get quickly to 
those levels. If stress tests show that a particular bank is undercapitalized in some tail-risk 
scenario, is it really necessary to force that bank to skip a dividend payment in the very next 
quarter? It seems like such rules could do more harm than good for financial stability. 
Observation 4: In peacetime, regular stress testing is critical to keep risk managers’ and 
supervisors’ eyes on the ball. 
In a crisis, supervisory stress testing takes on a special urgency: it can contribute to the very 
survival of a bank amidst uncertainty. In peacetime, stress tests—both supervisory and 
bank-run—are more like fire drills. They keep risk managers and supervisors focused on the 
biggest risks banks face. As currently implemented, they provide an opportunity for risk 
managers and supervisors to have very detailed, quantitative discussions about the 
implications of those risks, and they have become the preferred tool for supervisors to assess 
the quality of banks’ risk-management practices (see Schuermann, 2016). Supervisors 
believe the annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) exercise has had a 
substantial positive impact on banks’ risk management and corporate governance in the 
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peacetime period since the financial crisis (see Clark, 2019). Of course, there is a risk that 
models over time will become stale, as there is a tension between improving models and 
changing effective capital charges. 
Observation 5: Migration of financial activity away from banks, without appropriate oversight of 
the nonbank financial sector, will weaken financial stability. 
A critical unintended consequence of heightened regulation is the migration of financial 
activities to nonbanks or off-balance-sheet entities. Of course, some migration may be 
consistent with policy, in that regulators may prefer some activities be undertaken by 
someone other than systemically important banks.  
Still, the experience of the financial crisis highlighted the risks when activities take place in 
less regulated institutions and markets. In many cases, risks that had appeared to migrate 
away from banks ended up back in the banking system through explicit or implicit linkages. 
Stress tests should seek to capture these kinds of linkages by stressing banks’ off-balance 
sheet exposures and loans to nonbank financial institutions.  
Since the crisis, supervisors are more attuned to migration issues and have put in place new 
monitoring and analysis tools for nonbank financial intermediation. The term “shadow 
banking” became popular after the crisis to describe market-based financial intermediation 
activities that had introduced unanticipated systemic risks, particularly those activities that 
relied on short-term wholesale funding. The annual reports and monitoring efforts of the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council and Office of Financial Research have taken a broad 
view of potential financial stability risks, both from banking and nonbanking financial 
activities.  
It’s important to remember that regulatory arbitrage was a key driver in the growth of 
shadow banking before the crisis. For example, based on the regulatory capital rules at the 
time, banks could conserve capital by financing assets off-balance-sheet through commercial 
paper conduits. One of the early events in the crisis was the collapse in the asset-backed 
commercial paper market, which forced U.S. and European banks to bring billions of dollars 
of assets back onto their balance sheets (see Covitz, Liang, and Suarez, 2013).  
Meanwhile, stress tests can be an important tool for learning about migration. Scenarios and 
models could be designed to probe the interconnections between banks and nonbanks, and 
to learn about the ebb and flow of specific activities. Would a scenario that imagined a crash 
in mortgage-linked collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) prior to the crisis have helped us 
to see where those risks lay, both inside and outside of regulated banks? Maybe. 
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III. Recent Changes and Proposals 
How should we think about the financial stability implications of the recent and proposed 
changes to the stress-test regime, as the pendulum starts to swing back? The Fed has recently 
made or proposed some fundamental changes in its annual stress-test regime. These go to 
the proposed “Stress Capital Buffer,” the reduced scope of the exercise, increased 
transparency, and the elimination of the so-called “qualitative objection.”4 Here are some 
thoughts on the latest changes and proposals under discussion, based on our five 
observations. 
1. It’s a good idea to incorporate a Stress Capital Buffer into the stress test. Today’s capital 
rules include a capital conservation buffer, a 2.5% surcharge that sits atop regulatory 
minimums. There is also a countercyclical capital buffer that the Fed may implement to 
require banks to hold more capital when systemwide risks appear high. In April 2018, the 
Fed proposed replacing the capital conservation buffer with the higher of 2.5% or a Stress 
Capital Buffer (SCB), which would be based on a bank’s stressed losses under the Fed’s 
severely adverse scenario. The countercyclical capital buffer would be additive to the SCB. 
The SCB would also require banks to prefund four quarters of dividends. The SCB proposal 
is currently on hold as the Fed reviews comments on its proposal. We hope it will remain 
part of the plan. The SCB seems a sensible approach to combine the strengths of static 
regulatory capital minimums and dynamic capital standards based on stress-test results. 
2. Consider ways to tie the supervisory stress test to macroprudential policy goals. These 
could include (1) using stress-test scenarios to further probe bank and nonbank linkages, as 
noted in Observation 5. They could also include (2) tying the countercyclical capital buffer 
to the results of the supervisory stress tests in some way, as the Bank of England has done 
(Observation 1). Regulators’ comparative advantage is looking at the financial system on a 
systemic level—let’s use that advantage. The Fed models should be designed to be maximally 
informative for the countercyclical capital buffer, and then used directly—but not 
formulaically—in setting it. 
At the same time, the countercyclical capital buffer would be a more effective countercyclical 
tool if, also following the Bank of England, the Fed built and maintained a non-zero 
countercyclical capital buffer in normal times, rather than wait for the fairly frothy signals of 
above-normal risks that the Fed has said guide its analysis. The Fed could then have the 
 
4 Most of these proposals were included in the Fed’s April 2018 notice of proposed rulemaking with request for 
comment (see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2018a). 
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discretion to allow banks to draw down on such a buffer during stressed times, such as the 
pandemic crisis. 
3. Consider some easing of the immediate impact of stress tests on banks’ capital planning, 
to ensure banks do not face rapidly shifting capital requirements during peacetime. This 
would be consistent with Observations 1 and 3. A central complaint of banks is that the 
results of the stress tests can seem volatile, even capricious, particularly when they require 
rapid changes in capital planning. They have a point. There is no great benefit to making 
banks quickly change capital plans in peacetime, and there can be significant costs.  
Inevitably, if capital requirements are tied to the results of stress tests, they will introduce 
some volatility into capital planning. But there are mitigants. If the Fed follows through with 
the proposed Stress Capital Buffer, adjustments should be slow, and banks should have time 
to revise their capital plans. 
4. Maintain the G-SIB buffer under stress. Some large banks have proposed that the G-SIB 
buffer should be available for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) to draw down in 
the stress-test exercise (see Financial Services Forum, 2018, pp. 7-8). Under the Fed’s April 
2018 proposal, the G-SIB buffer would continue to be part of the regulatory buffer 
throughout the severely adverse scenario—not something that banks could draw down.  
The Fed’s proposal seems to have this right. Banks argue that G-SIBs have already reduced 
the risks G-SIBs pose to financial stability through their compliance with various other post-
crisis regulatory policies, including the stress tests and, specifically, the Global Market Shock 
scenario that stress tests include for most G-SIBs.  
But the G-SIB capital buffer is intended to mitigate the risks that a failing G-SIB would pose 
to the financial system as a whole, not as another buffer to draw down in a crisis (see Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2018a). This is related to Observation 1: 
Supervisory stress tests serve a macroprudential purpose. The financial crisis experience 
shouldn’t be forgotten. At the bottom of the next financial cycle, we may again be confronted 
with a G-SIB (or a handful of G-SIBs) with depleted capital and a market that fears losses 
could get still worse. At that time, we will be glad we have required G-SIBs to hold extra 
capital to prevent fear of their failure from worsening a bad situation and, in the extreme, 
inspiring consideration of another taxpayer bailout. 
5. Reconsider the exemption for large but less systemically important banks. The population 
of banks covered by the stress tests has varied from 30 to 35 in recent years. Under a change 
in the 2019 stress-test exercise that responded to an act of Congress, only about 15 
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companies will continue the annual exercise, while most of the others that participated in 
the 2018 exercise will shift to a two-year cycle.  
This revision appears consistent with a structural macroprudential policy approach, 
focusing supervisory resources on the financial institutions that pose the greatest potential 
systemic risk, as per Observation 1. There may be benefits, as per Observation 3, to reducing 
the regulatory burden and the potentially excessive capital volatility for banks that are 
merely large but not huge, and that are relatively less complex and interconnected than the 
G-SIBs. And shifting to a two-year cycle shouldn’t allow these arguably medium-risk banks 
to dismantle their risk-management infrastructure or discontinue the use of stress testing in 
capital planning, so it’s possible (though not assured) that they may still be able to keep their 
eyes on the ball (Observation 4).  
But we doubt the benefits to these firms of shifting to a two-year cycle outweigh the costs to 
the exercise, measured by the narrowing of the Fed’s macroprudential scope and the 
weakening of a key cyclical macroprudential tool. Remember Observation 5: using stress 
tests to track migration of activities away from the banking sector. Unforeseen exposures to 
mortgage-linked CDOs created the largest unanticipated capital losses to banks, insurance 
companies, and others in the financial crisis (see Cordell, Feldberg, and Sass, 2019). There is 
no guarantee that any of the tools now available to supervisors would have helped them 
identify such a blind spot if there were a do-over. But to increase our odds of capturing the 
next hidden tail risk in the financial system, we should want supervisors to be able to look 
across as many institutions as possible in their stress testing.  
Along similar lines, a senior Fed official argued last year that the narrowing of scope 
“potentially pushes away from the broader cyclical perspective. Less of the banking industry 
will be covered by the stress tests, and assessments of the strength of the industry will be 
based on a smaller part of the whole” (see Hirtle, 2018). It is worth asking whether the Fed 
and other regulators will be able to fill these knowledge gaps through their ongoing oversight 
of these banks and their macroprudential surveillance of the broader financial system. 
6. Be careful about increasing transparency of inputs. Since SCAP, the Fed has always 
released detailed information about its stress scenarios and the impacts on individual banks. 
It has continued to expand disclosures about inputs—the models and methodologies it uses. 
In March, in keeping with the 2018 proposed rule, it took a big step forward by releasing 
indicative loan loss rates, loss results based on standardized portfolios, and enhanced 
descriptions of its models, in its announcement of the 2019 stress-test scenarios (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019d). This upfront transparency about the Fed’s 
scenarios and assumptions could make it easier for bank risk managers to evaluate the 
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capital implications of the tests for their institutions and manage the inherent volatility that 
stress-test-based capital standards introduce into their capital planning (Observation 3). 
Nonetheless, while banks have said “thank you,” they have also asked for even more. They 
say they need more details about the Fed’s models in order to improve their ability to meet 
supervisory expectations and manage volatility. They argue that such disclosure might also 
subject those models to more rigorous public review (see The Clearing House Association, 
2018). 
Still, going back to Observation 2, too much transparency about the models may have 
unwanted side effects. It’s worth noting that the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
the two massive housing government-sponsored enterprises, was required by statute in the 
years before the global financial crisis to subject them to stress tests that were public, and 
for which the scenarios were published in advance for public comment when revised. That 
experiment didn’t end well (see Frame, Gerardi, and Willen, 2015). Dan Tarullo, the former 
Fed governor who drove the bank stress tests in their early years, recently said the new 
disclosures went too far. “While the code itself has not been released, I suspect that the smart 
people who work on such things for the big banks now have most of what they need to 
reverse engineer the model’s loss functions” (see Tarullo, 2019). The result, he fears, will be 
more regulatory arbitrage: armed with this knowledge, banks “will find clever ways to 
reshape their assets so as to reduce capital requirements without reducing risk.”  
At the extreme, too much disclosure could encourage banks to focus their efforts on 
following the Fed’s models rather than continuously updating their own models. Such a 
“model monoculture” could blind risk managers to emerging risks and, worse, make it more 
likely that everyone misses a critical tail risk built into the models, as happened with the 
credit rating agencies’ structured finance credit loss models in the run-up to the global 
financial crisis. Too much disclosure could also make it easier for banks to game the Fed’s 
models by structuring new assets or products in ways that limit the ability of the models to 
pick up the true risks.  
One way the Fed could be more transparent is in describing its very high-level view of the 
state of financial stability risks. In other words, the Fed could commit to making a statement 
of its countercyclical policy stance for the purposes of the stress test. That statement could 
describe the Board’s judgment about the current status of the credit and financial cycle to 
provide the basis for its scenario decisions, comparable to but distinct from the Federal Open 
Market Committee’s comments about the direction of inflation and the economy that provide 
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the basis for monetary policy.5 With such transparency in place, the Fed could avoid more 
extreme proposals to subject Fed stress scenarios to the public notice process.6 
7. Consider bringing back the “qualitative objection.” In March, the Fed announced it would 
limit the use of the “qualitative objection” in the annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and 
Review (CCAR) exercise, except for banks that have been part of the process for four years 
or less (see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019c). That qualitative 
objection represented a significant break from tradition.  
Two years ago, the Fed eliminated the qualitative objection for large but non-complex firms; 
they’ve now eliminated it for everyone else. In the Fed’s view, firms subject to CCAR since it 
began have improved their capital planning processes sufficiently and to the point where the 
threat of publicly limiting distributions is no longer necessary. The Fed also argues that CCAR 
retains its essence as a rigorous assessment of capital planning processes. As in traditional 
supervisory practices, firms may be subject to rating downgrades or, at the extreme, public 
enforcement actions if they fail to meet supervisors’ expectations. The Fed recently revised 
its supervisory rating system for large financial institutions to include the assessment of 
capital planning and positions as a core component, informed by stress-test results (see 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2018b). 
Still, the qualitative objection had been a powerful tool for microprudential supervisors to 
ensure that risk managers were not becoming complacent during good times (Observation 
4). As in formal enforcement actions against banks, which supervisors disclose to the public, 
the possibility of public embarrassment following an objection to planned capital actions had 
been a significant motivator for banks to improve their risk management practices and had 
lent credibility to supervisory stress-test exercises. A former senior Fed official recently 
argued that, by removing the qualitative objection, the Fed has now “weakened its capacity 
to hold [banks] accountable for dangerously bad practices” (see Clark, 2019). Perhaps, 
 
5 The Bank of England essentially does this. In publishing its 2019 scenarios, it noted: “Reflecting the [Financial 
Policy Committee]’s assessment that the underlying vulnerabilities are broadly unchanged on the year, the 
stress-test scenario is very close to that in the 2018 [stress test]” (see Bank of England, 2019). Greenwood et al 
(2017) suggest that the Fed be required to disclose after each annual stress test a summary of the effective risk 
weights and capital charges on specific types of assets that resulted from the test. 
6 One industry group has proposed changes by the Fed “(1) subjecting the supervisory stress scenarios to the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process; (2) amending its existing Policy Statement on the Scenario Design 
Framework for Stress Testing to develop an empirically grounded framework to establish “guardrails” or outer 
boundaries on the severity of the supervisory stress scenarios; or (3) adopting a clear policy statement that 
more closely tethers GMS [the Global Market Shock scenario used to stress trading portfolios for some banks] 
to the adverse macroeconomic scenario” (see Financial Services Forum, 2018, p. 7). 
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following Observation 3, a reintroduced qualitative objection could come with a softened, 
delayed impact on bank capital measures. 
IV. Balancing the Costs and Benefits for Banks and Regulators 
Moving beyond the current debates, a key controversy remains: Have we struck the right 
balance between the needs of banks and their regulators (and taxpayers) in stress-test 
policy?  
While stress testing has become common supervisory practice in the post-crisis world, it is 
worth keeping in mind that key aspects of the Fed’s approach remain unusual. Most 
obviously, the Fed has built up a huge infrastructure so that it can rely as much as possible 
on its own models and methodologies, in the name of rigor, consistency, and independence. 
There are big differences in legal and administrative frameworks across countries that affect 
how they implement stress tests. Other countries may supply the scenarios but rely much 
more on companies for the conduct of the tests. There is a range of practices around 
scenario-setting, disclosure, and the ultimate policy goals of the exercise.  
Compared to microprudential bank capital rules, stress tests provide additional insights and 
the ability to fine-tune capital to risks. Some argue that U.S. bank regulators have imposed 
too many capital standards; it is possible there is an optimal, smaller number of regulatory 
constraints. On the other hand, there is a risk of relying too heavily on one or a few 
approaches. Both risk-weighted and non-risk-weighted ratios are subject to gaming, for 
example. The uncertainty about future outcomes suggests the need for built-in redundancies, 
or “robust control.”  
During the financial crisis, the Fed used the first stress test to determine how much capital, 
if any, banks would need to raise from investors to survive the stress scenario. Stress tests 
today can limit the extent to which individual banks can share profits with their 
shareholders. Bankers would like more freedom to set their own capital. They point out that 
the Fed expects banks’ boards of directors to be “responsible and accountable” for capital 
decisions—so why not let them do their job? (see Financial Services Forum, 2018, p. 4).  
This issue has two basic components. Whose models will be used? And how will the capital 
decision be made?  
Whose models? The original, SCAP stress test used a mix of models. To estimate losses, the 
Fed combined information from three sources: “top-down” estimates by agency economists, 
based on forecasts of industry-wide losses; “bottom-up” estimates by supervisors using 
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confidential supervisory information; and “bottom-up” estimates made by the banks 
themselves. Pre-provision net revenue was constructed using “top-down” supervisory 
estimates and “bottom-up” estimates based on bank-provided information (see Hirtle, 
Schuermann, and Stiroh, 2009).  
Since then, a different compromise has emerged. The Fed conducts its own stress tests, and 
the banks conduct theirs, subject to careful supervisory oversight. The firm’s stress tests are 
intended to reflect the particular risks facing each bank holding company. The Fed checks its 
work carefully through the supervisory process.  
In the Fed’s annual exercise, the banks provide the data, and the Fed conducts the analysis. 
As the Fed’s expertise and resources have increased, it has come to rely almost entirely on 
its own models and methodologies in the name of rigor, consistency, and independence. Its 
models are subjected to an internal validation process—comparable to processes that it 
expects banks themselves to conduct for themselves—and reviewed by external experts.  
The banks have little input into the Fed’s exercise. Only rarely does the Fed loosen its grip 
on the process to allow firm-provided or third-party model estimates to enter into its 
analysis. These are cases where supervisory models are not possible or appropriate, 
typically because available supervisory data are insufficient (see Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2019d, p. 6). Those rare cases include, for example, granular 
components of pre-provision net revenue about which companies have superior historical 
data and insights; and information about trading and counterparty losses that are 
sufficiently granular or complex that the firm’s internal models may be preferred to the 
Fed’s. In those cases, the Fed’s approach is trust-but-verify: examiners will monitor the 
performance of those inputs and seek additional data from banks before including them in 
the Fed’s exercise.  
The banks have said very clearly that they would like a bigger role in this process. But how 
could this work? As noted in Observation 1, banks know more about their own risks, 
regulators know more about systemwide risks. The compromise as currently constructed 
seems appropriate. If the supervisory stress tests evolve to focus more on macroprudential 
ends, and the bank-run tests continue to focus on microprudential ends—in other words, if 
the link between supervisory stress-test results and capital planning is loosened to some 
extent—the banks may come to see the issue of model disclosure as less urgent. And we 
could avoid too much disclosure (Observation 2).  
On the other hand, there may be a process that would allow supervisors to incentivize firms 
to provide better information to the supervisory stress tests without being gamed. A 
constructive dialogue about scenarios, assumptions, formulas, and models could lead to a 
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more cooperative, less adversarial relationship between banks and supervisors. Borrowing 
from SCAP’s use of multiple models, it may be conceivable to build a process through which 
banks could replace some Fed models with their own, subject to careful Fed approval, 
without sacrificing the Fed’s goal of consistency across the institutions subject to the test. Of 
course, such processes would need to be robust for the most poorly managed firms.  
At the end of the day, poor microprudential oversight can lead to macroprudential risks 
because of the systemic importance of some firms. And the quality of risk management was 
a direct determinant of individual large banks’ performance through the global financial 
crisis (see Stanton, 2011).  
Who decides? A simple rule-of-thumb, following Observation 1, would be that a bank’s board 
of directors should have more power over capital planning in peacetime, while regulators 
should be able to intervene quickly as war approaches. That’s essentially the process today: 
Automatic triggers under Basel III now limit dividends and share repurchases as a bank’s 
capital approaches regulatory minimums. Regulators still reserve the right to overrule 
capital distributions that exceed what banks committed to in their capital plans; the industry 
argues that should be unnecessary as long as a bank’s capital continues to exceed regulatory 
minimums (see Financial Services Forum, 2019, p. 6). 
V. Conclusion 
We have made five observations about stress-testing that may help inform the transition 
from wartime to peacetime stress tests: (1) Individual banks know more than supervisors 
about their banks’ idiosyncratic risks, but supervisors know more than banks about 
systemwide risks; (2) In bank supervision, transparency is a double-edged sword; (3) Even 
with perfect models accepted by everyone, banks and their regulators will rationally 
disagree on the optimal speed of adjustment after a stress test; (4) In peacetime, regular 
stress testing is critical to keep risk managers’ and supervisors’ eyes on the ball; and, (5) 
Migration of financial activity away from banks, without appropriate oversight of the 
nonbank financial sector, will weaken financial stability.  
Based on these observations, we have suggested: 
1) sticking with the stress capital buffer proposal; 
2) promoting the macroprudential goals of the supervisory stress test by probing bank 
and nonbank linkages, and by tying it to a revised countercyclical capital buffer, 
calibrated for normal times; 
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3) considering some easing of the immediate impact of stress tests on banks’ capital 
planning, to ensure banks don’t face rapidly shifting capital requirements during 
peacetime; 
4) holding firm on the G-SIB buffer, which is there to mitigate the additional risks that 
the failure of a large and systemic financial institution would pose to financial 
stability; 
5) reconsidering the move to ease stress-test requirements for apparently medium-risk 
big banks; 
6) slowing down the transparency train to avoid gaming, herding, and complacency in 
bank risk management; and, 
7) considering the resurrection of the qualitative objection, possibly with softer capital 
impacts. 
We have also suggested some expansion of banks’ role in supervisory stress testing and in 
determining their capital measures.  
Taken together, these suggestions would add up to a slightly different settling of competing 
interests than the current structure, but perhaps one better suited to peacetime.  
Meanwhile, the really important question underlying stress tests sometimes goes unasked: 
Would this process have made a difference in 2005, as the housing boom rapidly 
deteriorated into financial mania? Would it have fortified systemic capital and prevented 
official capital injections? Would it have helped supervisors identify many systemically 
important banks’ hidden exposures to tail risk in structured credit products and credit 
derivatives, their backdoor exposures to asset-backed commercial paper programs, the 
unanticipated vulnerability of the repo market? Will it now help us identify the next tail risk, 
even if it is similarly hidden where our regular supervisory and risk management practices 
are still not making us look?  
It is very possible that stress testing—with its heightened focus on analyzing the most 
granular exposures hidden on and off bank balance sheets—would have captured some of 
those pre-crisis market pathologies before the financial crisis was preordained. It is possible, 
in particular, that stress testing could have helped track the migration of risks from banks to 
markets, other companies, and back to themselves in opaque ways (Observation 5).  
Even today, market-based finance accounts for a larger share of finance and the economy in 
the U.S. than in any other large industrialized country. For that reason, it is particularly risky 
for U.S. regulators to focus so much of their supervisory energy on the banking sector. Stress 
testing of other significant financial institutions is essential. Supervisors have begun to 
extend stress testing to nonbanks, such as insurance companies and mutual funds. It can also 
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be extended to financial markets. For example, Paddrik and Young (2017) applied the Fed’s 
stress-test scenarios to derivatives market data to assess the ability of a central counterparty 
to withstand a severe credit shock. Such exercises require more and better data about 
individual firms’ exposures and their connections to each other in key markets. There may 
be many such opportunities to extend stress-test practices beyond bank balance sheets to 
increase the chance we will not be caught by surprise next time. 
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